

JOSÉ CELSO CARDOSO JR.

JOSÉ CARLOS DOS SANTOS

---

LABOR MARKET TRENDS  
IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM  
DEVELOPMENTALISM OPTIMISM  
TO THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

PhD in Development at the Institute of Economics of UNICAMP, PhD in Government and Public Policy from the Institute of Government and Public Policies at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. Since 1997, he is Planning and Research Technician at IPEA.

Bachelor in Social Sciences (PUC-SP, 2008), specialist in State, Government and Public Policy (UNB, 2012), attending master's degree in Political Science (Postgraduate Program in Political Science, Federal University of São Carlos, 2018).



---

# LABOR MARKET TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM OPTIMISM TO THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

JOSÉ CELSO CARDOSO JR.  
JOSÉ CARLOS DOS SANTOS

## 1. INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCE X NATIONAL SELF-ASSERTION

The history of Latin America has been marked, in general, by the critical disjunctive dependence with structural heterogeneity x national self-assertion. On the one hand, over time, there has been a reiteration of the structural features of (i) economic dependence, especially of a financial and technological nature, which reverberate in patterns of production and consumption derived from the dominant patterns at the international level, but unlikely to be extended to the totality of their domestic productive structures and of their populations; and ii) political dependence, ranging from a greater or lesser sense of relative independence to the US, which effectively controls the Latin American geopolitical board.

On the other hand, in turn, social actors and national voices of different shades have been alternating in time, with more or less presence and haughtiness (in terms of local political weight and occupation of symbolic spaces), in search of popular support and reasons (economic, social, political, and cultural) to counterbalance the notorious tendencies of subordination and external dependence, thus justifying calls for greater political freedom and economic autonomy to claim and construct alternative models of development, better aligned with emancipatory projects and national self-assertion .

All in all, it is clear that the pendulum of this critical disjunctive has historically fallen on the side of Latin American structural dependence,

vis-à-vis the universalization of liberal-conservative capitalism as the dominant mode of production and consumption in the region, and the tutelage (and sometimes imposition) of successive US governments on political models (authoritarian or moderately democratic) considered acceptable from the empire's point of view.

This means that Latin American social performance has been a function of a variable combination, country by country, between a more or less dependent capitalist dynamic, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an equally variable ideological domination in political and cultural terms. It is, therefore, under this more general institutional arrangement that one can observe the specific national cases and their endogenous variations.

In 2000, for example, it was possible to verify the existence of at least three regional variants, as shown in Table 1: (i) countries such as Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina presented, especially until the international crisis started in 2008, trajectories of dependent capitalist development, but minimally regulated by the respective national states; (ii) countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Chile, in turn, would have shared a type of capitalist development dependent on and naturalized by the explicit supremacy of the market; and (iii) countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador would have shared a type of dependent capitalist development, but contested by specific national attempts to confront and construct their own alternatives appropriate to structural dependence and ideological domination under way (GARCIA; CALVETE, 2015).

**Table 1. Latin America – groups of countries according to the type of capitalist dependence, years 2000**

Dependent and regulated capitalist development	Dependent and naturalized capitalist development	Dependent and contested capitalist development
Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina	Colombia, Mexico, Chile	Venezuela, Bolivia e Ecuador

Source: Elaborated and adapted by the authors, from Garcia and Calvete (2015).

According to the classification above, it is possible to regroup the different Latin American realities, considering the relative position of each

country according to the degree of structural heterogeneity of their economies, measured according to the methodology and typology of classification proposed in ECLAC studies (INFANTE, 2011; ECLAC, 2012b), from which we derived Table 2.

**Table 2. Latin America – groups of countries according to the degree of structural heterogeneity, 2000**

Moderate structural heterogeneity	Intermediate structural heterogeneity	Severe structural heterogeneity
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay	Brazil, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela	Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic

Source: Elaborated and adapted by the authors, from Infante (2011).

According to this classification, it can be seen that in Latin American countries the incorporation and internal diffusion of technical progress have not occurred in a generalized or homogeneous way. This means that the degree of structural heterogeneity – that is, the differences between the various productive strata in terms of the total productivity of the factors of production, as well as the importance of the activities they carry out and the number of jobs they generate – is higher precisely in the countries with low production capacity and technological diffusion, as a consequence of the precariousness of the productive relationships and chains between the existing economic sectors.

Obviously, the level of structural heterogeneity of economies is related to countries' economic and social performance. In this way, the higher the proportion of workers employed in activities of low aggregate productivity, the greater the heterogeneity of a country and vice versa. The consequence of these differentiated productive dynamics is that both GDP per capita and GDP per employed worker tend to be structurally smaller and more unstable in more heterogeneous countries.

Both approaches suggested above on how to analyze and classify Latin American countries, it's clear that both the capitalist economic dynamics and

the political-institutional attitude of each country are important to explain their historical trajectories and aggregate performance in the pendulum between structural dependence and national self-assertion, as suggested in Table 3 below.

**Table 3. Latin America – groups of countries according to the dependence-heterogeneity relation**

	<b>Moderate structural heterogeneity</b>	<b>Intermediate structural heterogeneity</b>	<b>Severe structural heterogeneity</b>
<b>Dependent and regulated capitalist development</b>	Argentina, Uruguay	Brazil	-
<b>Dependent and naturalized capitalist development</b>	Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica	Colombia, Panama	El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic
<b>Dependent and contested capitalist development</b>	-	Venezuela,	Bolivia, Ecuador

Source: Elaborated and adapted by the authors, from Infante (2011) and Garcia and Calvete (2015).

Based on this disjunctive is that the rest of this article is organized. After this brief introduction, Section 2 reasons out the central hypothesis of the study, Section 3 describes the recent behavior of some of the main labor market variables for Latin America, Section 4 does so in terms of the labor reforms carried out since the 1990s and sections 5, 6 and 7 detail the Latin American situation based on issues raised by the (in)formalization, social (de)protection and concentration vectors versus income distribution in the developmental and liberal phases already experienced in this XXI century. Finally, in the final considerations, we point out ways for a possible mitigation of the current crisis amid the disjunctive structural dependence versus national self-assertion of the Latin American peoples.

## 2. TRACES OF DEPENDENCE AND HETEROGENEITY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD OF WORK

Leite (2012, literal translation) is right when he states that “unlike the more optimistic predictions professed especially by the defenders of neoliberal principles and followers of single thinking, globalization was not the solution to all problems. On the contrary, it has brought a host of new problems, including to the developed countries”. This means that both capitalist dependence and structural heterogeneity have increased in Latin American countries in recent years, “making analysis of the whole more difficult” (Ibid.).

On the one hand,

the reality of the Mercosur countries contrasts strongly in social terms with that of countries that continue to follow the neoliberal model, such as Chile (where income concentration has been increasing significantly), Colombia (which is experiencing an ongoing process of social and labor precarization), and above all Mexico, which, because of its dependence on the United States, has been undergoing an intense process of labor market disruption. (Ibid., literal translation).

On the other hand,

unlike what the neoliberal ideology has always proclaimed, these reflections point to the centrality of the role of the nation-states in the elaboration and implementation of policies that may be fundamental to the destiny of the countries of Latin America. In fact, it was the deliberate intervention of the State in seeking alternative policies to those advocated by the Washington Consensus, which allowed for the inflection of the model of development and the framework of labor market disruption experienced by the Mercosur countries throughout the 1990s. (Ibid., literal translation).

In line with the cited author, Cardoso Jr. and Campos (2013, p. 115) had also stated that,

after at least two decades (1980s and 1990s) of great political instability, strong economic fluctuations and remarkable social deterioration in virtually all Latin American countries, the end of the first decade of the 2000s brought new life to the region in the political, economic and social dimensions. Perhaps it was no coincidence that, after the great neoliberal wave with its uniform package of liberalizing reforms had generated poor results from an economic standpoint, a certain political-institutional change leftward of the electoral spectrum managed to reconcile the maintenance of price stability with the resumption of economic growth rates somewhat higher than the average for the period 1980-2000.

This combination of factors, which in the mentioned document we call democratization with a certain leftism of political-institutional positions, combined with the resumption of certain economic growth with maintenance of inflationary stability, practically throughout the first decade of 2000, would have allowed the restriction or even the reversal of social trends harmful to the populations of those countries. Particularly, it is important to highlight the somewhat robust movement to restructure the labor market in practically all Latin America, a movement that has been associated with phenomena linked to the recovery of the general occupation of the labor force, the formalization of employment relationships, and a more than proportional increase of the remunerations of the base of the social pyramid, with the consequent distributive improvement within the working class (Ibid.).

So, from the developmentalism optimism practiced in the first decade of 2000 to the reiteration of the failure of liberalism already evident during the 1990s and progressively in vogue on the continent since, above all, the international (financial and productive) crisis of 2008, the countries of Latin America are seeing their economies oscillate once more from national self-assertion to dependence and structural heterogeneity.

In order to empirically substantiate the previous assertion, the rest of the text will cover technical studies by authors and international organizations, such as ILO and ECLAC, in order to contextualize and problematize the current situational moment of Latin American societies, without neglecting more evident national specificities.

### 3. AN OVERVIEW OF LABOR BEHAVIOR IN LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN

According to the ILO's Employment Outlook for the year 2017 (ILO, 2017), the average regional unemployment rate continued to grow, for the third year running, now to 8.4%, driven mainly by economic and labor market deterioration in Brazil.

While in 2016 unemployment increased in 13 of the 19 countries studied, in 2017 this happened "only" in 9 of the 19 countries. As a result of the dependent economic dynamics and the high structural heterogeneity within and between countries, it is clear that the unemployment rate has very different levels and performances depending on the subregions studied. Therefore, the highest rates have been registered in the Southern Cone, where the average subregional rate jumped from 10.7% in 2016 to 11.9% in 2017. Eliminating the negative impact that Brazil has on the region, there is actually a small reduction from 8.5% to 8.2% in the Southern Cone.

A small reduction was also observed in the Andean countries, of only 0.1%. A slightly higher reduction was registered for the group of countries in Central America and Mexico, from 4.5% in 2016 to 4% in 2017. In the Caribbean, unemployment decreased from 7.8% to 7.4% in the same bienium, but it is closer to the Southern Cone than Central America and Mexico.

With regard to gender statistics, the Employment Outlook reports that unemployment increased among women as well as among men, while maintaining the distances between them. Between 2016 and 2017, the unemployment rate for women increased from 9.9% to 10.4%, while for men it raised from 7.2% to 7.6%. But more significant and worrying is the fact that, for the first time in this decade, the female unemployment rate has surpassed the double digits, staying above the rate registered for men by about 1.4 times.

In terms of age, youth unemployment continues to grow at the regional average: from 18.9% in 2016 to 19.5% in 2017. In practical terms, this means that one in five young people seek and don't find work, which is equivalent to a contingent of approximately 10.2 million young people who are not currently employed on the continent. Also in relation to this point, Brazil has been contributing negatively to aggregate overall results.

As a consequence of this set of phenomena listed above, the trends that suggest a qualitative deterioration in the jobs generated are clear, as job creation has been lower in the formal salaried and protected sectors (which fell from 65.3% in 2013 to 63.4 % in 2016), which has been offset by greater job creation on its own (from 21.6% to 23.6% in the same period). Again, this situation has been worse in the countries of South America (impacted negatively by Brazil) than in Central America and Mexico.

As known, this productive heterogeneity is manifested in the fact that industry, which generates better quality jobs in terms of stability, remuneration and social protection, is the sector that has suffered the most from the global crisis adverse effects and the highly dependent and volatile economic dynamics in most Latin American countries. On the other hand, the sectors of trade and services of low productivity are precisely those that employ the least qualified labor force and precisely the sectors that have been increasing in participation in the composition of regional employment.

Finally, in terms of remuneration, looking at data over a broader time horizon, it is possible to understand why the first decade of 2000 had been identified as being of a certain developmentalism optimism. Between 2005 and 2015, there was a positive evolution of remuneration in general for practically all the countries of the region, which lasted until about 2012, when salaries were reduced and redistributive policies were cut back, mainly due to the international crisis in force since 2008 and the internal national adjustments resulting therefrom (ILO, 2017).

Despite the regional trend of wage growth, there were marked differences in its evolution at the subregional level. The largest increases in real wages were observed in the Southern Cone, followed by the Andean countries, which had increases close to the regional average, while in Central America and Mexico the wage increases were below average between 2005 and 2015. In this subregion, Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras experienced

contractions in their average real wages. On the other hand, the superior performance of the Southern Cone countries is related to the positive effects of the commodities rising prices cycle and with active policies of real wage increases practiced by the region's governments, such as the national policy of real appreciation of the minimum wage practiced by Brazil between 2007 and the coup of 2016.

It also helps to explain the difference between subregions the fact that, while in the Southern Cone countries and the Andean countries real wages in the private sector moved along with public sector wages, in Central America and Mexico the real wages of the public sector increased more than proportionately the salaries in the private sector. In addition, although wages for domestic workers have grown in all subregions, they remain the lowest on the pay scale in all countries.

But perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that the general improvement in remuneration observed until the adoption of new liberal-conservative orientations in most countries since the international crisis that has been taking place on the continent since 2008 has brought significant and generalized improvements in policies aimed at real minimum wages.

As is well known, the aim of minimum wage legislation and policies is to protect workers from unduly low payments. Its effective application contributes, therefore, to workers of lower wages to participate in a more equitable way of the fruits of technical progress, reason why the minimum wage policies are important pieces for economic paths of inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and remuneration inequalities.

In these terms, between 2005 and 2015 there were significant and generalized improvements in real minimum wages in the Latin American continent, which increased by an average of 42% in the period, some 3.6% in real terms per year. The increase was higher in the Andean countries (4% p.a.), followed by the countries of the Southern Cone (3.8% p.a.), and Central America and Mexico (3% p.a.). Internally to the subregions, it can be seen that the greatest positive changes occurred in Honduras, Uruguay and Bolivia; while the smaller ones occurred in Paraguay, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Colombia.

In addition, when analyzing the effects of the minimum wage on poverty conditions, it is clear that, despite the improvements identified, this

official base salary is still insufficient to remove from poverty most of the households composed of four people on average and which belong to the quota of 50% of the poorest households in each country. In part, this is due to non-compliance with legislation by private sector entrepreneurs, and, in part, this is related to the still very low official level of these remunerations.

In any case, the positive effect that minimum wages have played in the national trajectories of diminishing remuneration levels, that is, in the distributive improvement observed mainly within the working class, is not of minor importance. During the period 2005-2015, there was a significant reduction of the wage gap in all subregions of the continent. In the private sector, there were relatively smaller declines in the wage gap in the countries of the Southern Cone and Central America and Mexico and a slight increase in the Andean countries. Concomitant to this, there was an increase in the wage bill and improvement in the distributive indicators. The largest increase in total wages was in the Southern Cone (9.8%) and the Andes (4.2%), while in Central America and Mexico, the wage bill remained constant in relative terms. In distributive terms, in turn, there was a reduction of labor income inequality in all subregions of the continent. This tendency, however, was only persistent until 2013, confirming the hypothesis of discouragement and failure of the liberal model in its (in)capacity to maintain the impetus and developmentalism optimism of the immediately previous years (ILO, 2017).

#### **4. REFORM OF LABOR RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

The scope of labor reforms in Latin America has been at the heart of the regional debate in the last 30 years, at least. Labor flexibility indexes, their scope, magnitude and importance in terms of their potential to create jobs have been the subject of controversial discussion to determine the weight and role of labor legislation on the economic and social performance of the countries of the region.

As shown by the available data and analysis (RUÍZ, 2005), the legal changes introduced in most Latin American countries, which are generally flexible in nature, have been numerous and comprehensive, although in some cases and at specific times they have guaranteed and attempted to strengthen social protection. In a

number of countries, the modifications were limited to redesigning or specifying the existing standards. In Argentina and Peru, for example, reforms have been more profound and more flexible. Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama, however, introduced reforms, which, although less extensive, were also guided by a more flexible approach. In Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, flexibilizing reforms were apparently still less extensive, but also because these countries were already (at the time of this study by Ruiz, 2005) on a more flexible basis in terms of allocation and remuneration in the labor market. Finally, in Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay, one cannot speak of labor reform in the strict sense, given the only punctual content of some measures.

Regarding the content of these reforms, although most of them – implemented throughout the 1990s all over Latin America – attempted to activate flexibilization mechanisms for individual labor relations, the fact is that most of the most recent initiatives in the first 2000 focused on collective labor relations, often drawing inspiration from ILO standards (RUZ, 2005). In this sense, much of the most recent labor reforms in the region reflect some of the most important advances of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. Among the recommendations, one of the most interesting was the progressive development and social legitimacy of collective agreements as the most appropriate regulatory source for the normalization of formalized labor relations. Nevertheless, in terms of conflict resolution, the scarce development of real content in collective bargaining makes the more progressive regulations even less credible.

Given the set of previous considerations, we can reaffirm the general idea of this article, according to which there is a strong correlation between the poor performance of labor markets in Latin America during the liberal decade of 1990 and the set of liberalizing reforms carried out in those countries, while on the other hand, in the period of developmentalism optimism of the first decade of 2000, when the general orientation of the reforms was less liberalizing and more focused on the ILO recommendations, there was a better and more promising performance of the labor markets in terms of job creation, formalization, remuneration, union representation, social protection, access to labor justice and distributive improvement.

In light of this, the next step is to better evidence these results in formalization, social protection, and income redistribution as positive

traits of the short period of developmentalism, vis-à-vis the situational and progressively negative trends due to the new (but worse!) current wave of liberalization on the continent.

## 5. LABOR FORMALIZATION: FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM OPTIMISM TO THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

According to Weller,

since the succession of crises that affected the region since 1998, grew the questioning of many of the policies applied. In the labor sphere, the proposals for broad deregulations did not disappear from the discussions, but they undoubtedly lost political weight. As a result, reforms have focused more on strengthening active labor market policies than on changing individual or collective labor relations. The high economic growth that benefited the region from 2003/2004 opened space for a favorable context for the generation of employment and the improvement of its quality. In a number of countries, especially under left-leaning governments rather than the predominant one in the 1990s, there was another attempt to regulate the labor market, strengthening trade union organization, social dialogue, training, and formalization of employment. (2012b, p. 38, literal translation).

This quote corroborates the statements made in the previous sections, in order to prove that, during the so-called period of developmentalism, in which a more lofty and active political-institutional attitude of some countries towards capitalist dependence was combined with economic and social dynamics that were stronger and nationally determined in terms of job creation and income, there is a better and more sustainable aggregate performance both from an economic and a political point of view. Still in the words of the same author,

from 2003-2004, in the context of relatively high and prolonged economic growth for Latin America, the medium and high productivity

sectors began to generate jobs in significant quantities. Thus, they increased their participation in the urban occupational structure from 48.8% in 2002-2003 to 52% in 2008-2009. At the same time, the widening of productivity gaps was contained. [...] Nevertheless, it is clear that the productive and institutional economic structure of Latin America has not been able to generate the necessary quality jobs to reduce poverty in a substantive way. In fact, at the end of the last decade, in the simple average of 18 countries, 23% of the urban Latin American employed were poor and 7%, indigent. In the case of rural workers (in 16 countries), this proportion rises to 41% and 22%, respectively. On the other hand, although being employed reduces the possibility of being poor, it is far from securing a decent income. Among the employed, poverty mainly affects self-employed workers, unpaid family workers and, to a lesser extent, private wage earners. Another occupational category that usually registers bad indicators of quality is domestic service, both in terms of income and the possibility of having a labor contract and social protection. (Ibid., p. 43, literal translation).

Given this framework, Tokman (2009) suggests five pillars to combat and incorporate the informal economy into a more economically structured and socially more just dynamic<sup>1</sup>, namely:

- I) productive and regulatory development of informal activities: it is about recognizing to microentrepreneurs and self-employed the right to develop productive activities that allow them to generate income while at the same time reducing the vulnerability derived from their informal status;
- II) labor rights in informal enterprises with limited payment capacity: informal firms account for more than a third of Latin America's private sector wage earners, and 68% of them do not have written labor contracts. This means that, for the majority, labor and social protection is not a right since it lacks a recognized

---

1 See also Tokman (2010), Durán (2011), and Amarante and Arin (2015).

working condition. In turn, the informal productive units have little ability to pay to meet the obligations inherent to the labor relationship;

- III) measures against insecurity and the lack of protection of informal workers in formal enterprises: insecurity and lack of protection are associated with the absence of legally and explicitly recognized labor relations, but also with the existence of relationships governed by contracts other than the contract of employment for an indefinite period. Both situations present themselves in both micro and formal enterprises. Nevertheless, the first one predominates in informal enterprises, while the second one in formal enterprises, so that their workers consider themselves members of the informal economy;
- IV) regulation of diffuse labor relations: a fourth area of regulation is the so-called diffuse labor relations, because they are difficult to recognize, are hidden or are left unassisted due to omissions of labor legislation or legal supervision. In many cases, the obligations and rights of the parties are unclear, which can lead to the loss of worker protection. In addition, such diffuse relations are increasingly important in the context of globalization and decentralization of production, which is why it is necessary to establish workers' rights and assign responsibilities with respect to the fulfillment of obligations between different companies involved;
- V) social protection for informal workers: providing social protection coverage to those in the informal sector requires a strategy that can range from expanding coverage of existing systems to the development of new protection instruments such as insurance and the consolidation of resources provided by the informal workers themselves. Such coverage should include health services, pensions and, given the predominance of women workers in this contingent, maternity coverage. It would also extend to microentrepreneurs workers and to those self-employed. In the case of informal workers in formal enterprises, responsibility for protection should be linked to the improvement of the employment contract and the shared contribution with the employer.

It is evident that such a set of recommendations, although correct, can only have an effective course in developmental contexts of greater national autonomy, in contrast to the current trends of market liberalization and, therefore, an increase in dependence and structural heterogeneity in Latin American societies.

## 6. SOCIAL PROTECTION: FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM OPTIMISM TO THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

Social protection is a phenomenon here understood considering the capacity of social coverage provided by a pre-defined set of social policies – policies that transfer monetary income in the scope of social security, social assistance and employment, labor and income policies, as widely discussed in Castel (2010) or Cardoso Jr. (2013), from where we have removed and adapted Tables 4 and 5 below.

**Table 4. The worlds of social protection and deprotection according to the condition of activity of the population of active and inactive age in the dominant models of labor and social protection in Latin America**

	<b>WORLD OF WORK</b>	<b>WORLD OF INACTIVITY</b>
<b>SOCIAL PROTECTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. protected contributory occupation: urban pension regimes and a specific regime for civil servants;</li> <li>2. protected contributory self-occupancy;</li> <li>3. special insured: partially contributory rural coverage schemes;</li> <li>4. temporary protection: unemployment insurance.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. social security coverage: urban and rural regimes and a specific regime for civil servants;</li> <li>2. state + philanthropic assistance coverage;</li> <li>3. private pension coverage.</li> </ol>
<b>SOCIAL DEPROTECTION</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. unprotected occupation: salary without a contract;</li> <li>2. unprotected self-employment: self-employed non-contributors;</li> <li>3. involuntary unemployment.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. absence of social security coverage (state or private);</li> <li>5. absence of care coverage (state or philanthropic).</li> </ol>

Source: Cardoso Jr., 2013. Elaborated by the authors.

**Table 5. The degree of social protection by social classes and provider entities in situations typical of Latin America**

<b>Obtaining social protection by social classes and providers – Brazil</b>			
	<b>High classes</b>	<b>Middle classes</b>	<b>Low classes</b>
<b>State</b>	Medium	High	High
<b>Market</b>	High	Medium	Low
<b>Families</b>	Medium	High	High
<b>Civil society</b>	Low	Low	Medium

Source: Cardoso Jr., 2013. Elaborated by the authors.

The theoretical-methodological substrate to understand the definition of restricted protection shown in Table 4 is the observation that every society, at each moment of time, triggers and combines in a differentiated way (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) four large social segments, clearly discernible, in the indispensable task of generating social protection for its population or, more modernly, its community of families and citizens (ESPING-ANDERSEN, 2000).

The four major social segments are: the state, the market, families and civil communities operating in each national space, which include not only the diffused and poorly institutionalized communities' action, but also the so-called non-state public sector or third sector. In the Latin American case, there would be some division of responsibilities or attributions for those four major social segments, as Table 5 below illustrates.

In general terms, we could say that social protection for the upper classes in the distributive pyramid would depend heavily on their access to private education markets (especially at the primary and secondary levels), health and supplementary social security, even if the state appears, to some extent, as provider of certain goods and services, especially in higher education, certain health specialties, public pension pay ceilings, etc. On the other hand, the middle strata of the social pyramid would be mostly covered by public policies of the state, especially in education, health, welfare and public security, with the high participation of family networks in the provision of an important part of goods and services in these same areas. For these strata, the contribution of the market is average in the provision

of goods and services. Finally, the lower social classes of the distributive pyramid would be mainly dependent on the state and the families, with a low participation of the market and an average participation of the organized civil society in the provision of goods and social protection services to these segments.

Having said that, and focusing hereafter only on the link between employment and social protection, we see that historically this linkage is based on the centrality of work as a mechanism for inclusion, access to well-being and also on the dialectic of contributions and acknowledgments of people (ECLAC, 2012b). This articulation presupposes the capacity to modernize the productive structure and the economic dynamism necessary to enable full employment, mostly formalized and contributory to social security, with contributions from different sources, including public social spending. The link between employment and social protection also implies that the actors have functions defined in the institutional framework of negotiation and balance of powers, in which the state plays a fundamental role in ensuring such balance, so that the productive process translates into shared benefits between the actors (Ibid.).

It follows that the structural dynamics of dependence and heterogeneity that dominate Latin America impose regional, sectorial, labor and social inequalities of several orders, so much that, on the one hand, there are restrictions to expressive sectors of the population to integrate into the existing social security networks. There is a large group of excluded from protected formal employment, with precarious insertions, high turnover, low and oscillating wages, almost no patrimony or reserve of assets and human capacities, situations that lead to the absence or precariousness of bonds and contributory contributions for large population groups. On the other hand, the dynamics of informality, flexibilization and new forms of organization and labor contracting have undermined the stability of jobs, weakening the union actors and the protective status of labor, therefore, the capacity of appropriation and transmission of productivity gains produced by the system (ECLAC, 2012b).

In most Latin American countries, the combination of fiscal restraint and economic deregulation left little room for states to meet the welfare needs of their populations. This has reinforced the development of welfare and targeted public policies, very far from a basic universalism of social

welfare. As a result, the links between structural heterogeneity, (un)employment and social (de)protection in most countries of the region appear more clearly than ever before. Hence the correct insistence of ECLAC in several of its official documents (ECLAC, 2010; ECLAC, 2012a; ECLAC, 2012b; ECLAC, 2014; ECLAC, 2016; ECLAC, 2017; ECLAC, 2018), and of other authors (BIELSCHOWSKY; TORRES, 2018; INFANTE, 2011; SOJO, 2017; TOKMAN, 2010; WELLER, 2012a; etc.) in order to affirm that

without productive convergence, structural inequalities will continue to translate into persistent exclusions and inequalities in the labor market. Without employment, it is difficult to advance to equality of opportunity and to active citizenship, since it constitutes the established mechanism of capitalist society to make contributions and retributions possible, to move from the private to the public, and to give personal life sense as a contribution to collective progress. Without social protection, important sectors of the population will continue to struggle to enter the world of work, and even if they enter, they will continue to be recurrent victims of the inequalities that the labor market reproduces. (ECLAC, 2012b, p. 27, literal translation).

Notwithstanding the fact that the scenario above is Latin America's historical pattern in terms of the relationship between the world of work and social protection, a typical pattern of contexts of dependence and heterogeneity sharpened in moments of liberal-conservative predominance of growth models preached by the market ideology, the region experienced, in a short period of time, in the early 2000s, a set of situations that elicited a certain developmentalism optimism.

First, there was a certain economic dynamic favorable to inclusive growth, with a general improvement in labor market indicators (greater and better employment, formalization, remuneration, social protection, deconcentration of labor income in 11 of the 18 countries studied), poverty reduction and indigence, and a consistent increase in the share of social spending in national income concomitant with the increase in tax revenues without generalized inflationary pressure (Ibid.).

Secondly, the region as a whole demonstrated that it was able to take advantage of the demographic bonus generated by a lower dependency ratio, that is, an increase in the proportion of the employed population of working age over the inactive dependent population (Ibid.).

Thirdly, although in the economic field predominantly exclusionary and even regressive orientations persisted, in the field of social policies the orthodoxy of the eighties and nineties seemed to give room to new ways of thinking about the role of the state in guaranteeing social protection, poverty and inequality reduction. The evidence for this is that in the first decade of 2000, public policies aimed at strengthening the non-contributory pillar of social protection were set in motion in several Latin American countries, and, in a more universalist logic, efforts were made to extend social rights and services in health, education, public welfare and social assistance, especially in the field of money transfer programs to poor and vulnerable segments in each country (Ibid.).

Finally, even in the face of the international economic crisis triggered in 2008, there were unconventional (meaning, non-liberal-conservative) reactions on the part of the Latin American governments that at the time attempted to practice somewhat more autonomous or contestatory orientations to the dominant pattern of policies suggested by international organizations. In such cases, as in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, countercyclical policies to maintain aggregate demand (through public investments and social spending) were implemented with variable success in each specific case (Ibid.).

As demonstrated by the Brazilian experience in 2003-2013,

not only was it possible to reconcile a certain resumption of economic growth with a general restructuring of the labor market and the maintenance of monetary stability, as that happened without a profound reform – the mantra of liberalism – of the pattern of labor regulation or social protection in the country. (CARDOSO JR.; HAMASAKI, 2014, p. 28, literal translation).

This has demonstrated the intrinsic incompatibility between the historically constituted models in Latin America of structuring labor markets with social protection and the liberal models of development. This incompatibility is fundamentally due to the inadequacy that exists between liberal economic dynamics and the heterogeneous and unequal nature of the Latin American labor market. Liberal models are thus unsuitable for late

peripheral economies such as those in Latin America, and counterproductive to labor markets derived from them (CARDOSO JR., 2013).

## 7. REDISTRIBUTION VERSUS INCOME RECONCENTRATION: FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM OPTIMISM TO THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

During the short period of developmentalism optimism in Latin America, basically the first decade of the 2000s, there was a virtuous combination of tendencies present in their national labor markets, which, coupled with the respective models of social protection (labor, social security, and welfare), allowed the coexistence between a dynamic of economic growth favorable to the reduction of the structural heterogeneity in each country, with indicators of reduction of the concentration of labor income in most cases.

This phenomenon, on the one hand, rare in Latin America's long history, and on the other hand dependent on a combination and maintenance of simultaneous public policies of growth and redistribution, had positive effects on the productive dynamics and on critical variables of the labor market, which helped to place equality again at the center of the Latin American debate on development during this period.

ECLAC, for example, argues that this happened for two reasons:

first, because it endows policies with a rights-based approach at their very foundation, along with a vocation of humanism that embodies the most treasured legacy of modernity. Second, because equality is also a prerequisite for progress with a development model that focuses on closing structural gaps and on convergence towards higher levels of productivity, economic and environmental sustainability for future generations, the dissemination of the knowledge society and the strengthening of democracy and full citizenship. (ECLAC, 2018, p. 19<sup>2</sup>).

Therefore, the central message consisted in affirming that inequality implies great costs of micro and macroeconomic efficiency, from which

---

<sup>2</sup> This page corresponds to the English version of the work cited by the authors.

results the idea that its overcoming is a necessary condition for inclusive and sustainable development.

According to this approach,

Equality is a necessary condition for maximizing the dynamic efficiency of the economy in that it creates a framework of institutions, policies and efforts that place the highest priority on innovation and capacity-building. From that perspective, equality is more important today than in the past because of the impact of the technological revolution, which makes building capacities and closing gaps a more urgent and unavoidable task. That urgency is heightened by the unsustainable nature of the current pattern of growth, which requires that the technological revolution be put to work in transforming the energy mix and channelling production processes along low-carbon paths in order to preserve the environment and its productive services for future generations. (ECLAC, 2018, p. 21<sup>3</sup>)

The mechanisms through which the relationship between causality and efficiency operates are the much broader diffusion in society of education and skills; the elimination of barriers to creativity and to the effort that any kind of discrimination represents; social welfare provided by the welfare state, which enables agents to accept, to a greater degree, the risks inherent in innovation; and overcoming the culture of privilege and political economy that closes down the way for new agents, sectors and ideas that transform the economy and challenge rentier behaviors based on static comparative advantages or political privileges. (ECLAC, 2018, p. 7, literal translation).

Given this position, which has been corroborated both from the theoretical and the empirical point of view, Weller (2012a) argues that the generation of productive jobs is a necessary first condition to reduce the

---

3 This page corresponds to the English version of the work cited by the authors.

high heterogeneities and inequalities still present in Latin America. Without this productive and sustainable insertion over time into the production and consumption structure of the Latin American population, regional inequalities are unlikely to be addressed and reduced only on the basis of welfare programs or monetary transfers. Therefore, the creation of productive employment must be the starting point for national strategies to reduce inequalities in the productive structure and labor markets, without forgetting the importance of wage and welfare policies as complementary tools.

Among them, policies to ensure access to education and health, which, by enhancing individual capacities and collective opportunities, promote innovation and increases in systemic productivity. When a person drops out of school before completing primary or secondary education, their productive potential resents for the rest of their active life. The lower salary received, *ceteris paribus*, in relation to workers with more years of formal education, is an indicator of the loss of productivity and well-being that this abandonment implies. The magnitude of this loss is very high over time. The cost to society does not end in the future loss of income of the person who does not continue his studies, since there are positive externalities associated with the interaction between people with high education level; in other words, the social benefit of investing in education goes beyond private benefit. When inequality impedes access to education, its effects are not local, but spread out, affecting the entire economic system. In Latin America, a very significant proportion of the population over 18 years of age does not reach a level equivalent to the first cycle of complete secondary education, and besides there are notable differences between the first and last income quintile. On the other hand, the situation of the countries is heterogeneous. At one extreme is Guatemala, where only 50% of the population over 18 reaches a level equivalent to the completion of the first cycle of secondary education. At the other extreme is Chile, where this number exceeds 80% (*Ibid.*).

There are other dimensions of inequality that are closely related to these more traditional ones. One of them is its territorial expression, since poverty or low levels of development are concentrated in certain areas. Cities are part of this territorial dynamic that tends to spatially concentrate development and generate polarization, both in the cities themselves and

in their relationship with the rural world. Other inequalities are related to environmental deterioration: the poorer sectors are those that suffer the most from the negative consequences of pollution in urban areas, and poor peasants work in the most degraded rural ecosystems. On the other hand, the existing infrastructure and investment patterns in this infrastructure consolidate and reproduce territorial and environmental inequalities (Ibid.).

With regard to such dimensions of inequality, the Latin American Regional Development Index (RDI) of 2015, elaborated by ECLAC, offers a broad perspective of territorial inequalities. Differently from the traditional analyzes of territorial disparities that take as a reference the averages of each country, RDI compares the relative development level of 175 territorial entities from eight Latin American countries to the regional averages. This approach incorporates additional dimensions of per capita GDP, such as health, education and access to public services. The RDI of 2015 makes it possible to identify macroregions with the greatest relative shortcomings in economic and social development, such as northeastern Brazil, southwest Mexico and the Andean and Amazonian zones of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (Ibid.).

Another important dimension highlighted by ECLAC is the relationship between inequality and institutions. The intergenerational transmission of poverty reflects and reinforces the intergenerational transmission of exclusionary institutions. One factor explaining this persistence is that inequality is incorporated into the culture of society, which perceives as natural that certain groups enjoy the rights denied to others. This creates a culture of privilege that is implicitly accepted by both privileged and excluded groups. In short, the direct effect of inequality on learning and skills adds up to a perhaps less visible but no less important effect: the weakening of state capacities and the effectiveness of public policies. The political economy of inequality and its close relationship with the institutions and culture that govern social relations are a barrier to increasing productivity and growth, since they limit the supply of public goods that are essential for the existence of competitive markets and innovative agents. In turn, in a democratic society, public goods are a materialization of equality and a sense of belonging (Ibid.).

For example, the people of African descent, whose ancestors were enslaved and subjected to forced labor, continues to suffer higher levels of

poverty, lower levels of education, greater exposure to the negative effects of territorial segregation and an occupational insertion in the most precarious niches of the labor market. The poverty rates of indigenous and African descent populations are higher than those of the rest of the population, while poor income distribution illustrates the association between ethnicity and social inequality, with a much higher percentage of African descent and indigenous people in the poorer quintile (Ibid.).

From the perspective of development with equality, the culture of privilege is disturbing because it naturalizes the relationship between the place that one occupies in the social scale and the greater or lesser access to education, health, work, security and the habitability of the place in which one lives. This dynamic is disseminated in multiple spheres, in which structural and institutional factors compete to perpetuate or recreate an order of unequals. The tributary system of the region expresses this culture of privilege.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, tax privileges continue to exist, such as exemptions, evasion, elision, and low income tax. Much of the tax burden is indirect and falls on consumption, while the income tax is lower than that on average in the OECD countries. The average tax burden in the region is half the average for a group of 15 European Union countries, and this difference is concentrated in the income tax of individuals. In the region, most of the tax burden comes from consumption taxes and has a regressive effect. The great difference between the redistributive power of fiscal policy in Latin American and Caribbean countries and that of developed economies lies in monetary transfers and direct taxes, since the fall in the Gini coefficient caused by the distribution of spending on education and health is similar in both groups. On average, the region's Gini coefficient falls only three percentage points after direct tax action, while the public provision of education and health services reduces it by six additional points (ECLAC, 2018).

In European countries and other OECD economies, the aggregate redistributive effect of monetary transfers and personal income tax is 19 and 17 percentage points respectively on average, while redistribution through public spending is between 6 and 7 percentage points. The weak redistributive effect of taxation, whether by composition and tax burden, lack of effective

investigation or current benefits, is part of a system of privileges in which those who have more do not perceive the social commitment to contribute to the common good by fiscal means. However, a clear redistributive effect obtained through taxation, which can be perceived as a norm of society, is not only indispensable to promote more equality, but also constitutes a communicative and awareness-raising signal on equal rights.

## 8. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

ECLAC is right (2016, p. 29) when it states that

the dominant type of development has generated enormous imbalances, and its transformation is a complex task. The difficulty lies in political economy, the set of interests and alliances that dominate and define the rules of the game, both internationally and domestically. There is a clear conflict. Several actors, both public and private, have an interest in protecting their investments and the current distribution of profitability; others would have much to gain from the transition to a more inclusive and environmentally sustainable growth pattern. The problem is that the costs of converting to a new standard are immediate and concentrated, while the benefits will be perceived in the future and are diffuse. In particular, the distribution of costs and benefits is in inverse correlation with the distribution of power in the current style, which makes it difficult to build alliances to move forward.

For these reasons, ECLAC (2016) draws attention to the necessary governance mechanisms in four areas: i) an international coordination of economies that favors the sustained expansion of investment, based on fiscal policies that prioritize low carbon and higher efficiency energy projects; ii) a new international financial architecture that reduces real and price volatility and advances on the reform of the international monetary system; iii) trade and technology governance on a multilateral basis, facilitating and expanding access to technology and financing for the decoupling of growth and

environmental impact, thus facilitating the correction of asymmetries between countries and regions; and (iv) shared governance of key components of the digital economy at the global and regional levels. These tasks demand, simultaneously, at the national level in each country, a commitment to the universalization of social protection and the provision of education and health services to generate proactive responses to the uncertainty inherent in globalization and technological revolution.

With regard to macroeconomics, the need for a development-oriented policy, which, in addition to controlling inflation, strengthens the counter-cyclical instruments, articulating the objectives of financial stability with those of the productive transformation and the improvement of income distribution (ECLAC, 2010). With regard to social policies, the focus on rights and the quest for substantive equality stand as axes of the new welfare regimes, in order to make it possible to take advantage of the synergies between equality and efficiency of the economic system. In environmental matters, attention is focused on three pillars of decarbonization, which include the digitization of society and production (particularly micro-enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, due to their weight in job creation and wages), the development of sustainable cities and the emphasis on renewable energies (ECLAC, 2018).

Specifically about the world of work, Weller (2012b) points out guidelines for improving working conditions in Latin America: i) face high instability as a characteristic of the labor market; ii) improve the institutions of existing work; and (iii) address inequality linked to working conditions. However, according to Weller, it is important to emphasize the importance of policies that foster high and sustainable economic growth, stimulate continuous increases in labor productivity, and reduce important productivity gaps between segments of the productive structure, as also emphasize Toledo and Neffa (2010), when analyzing the dominant productive models in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

In the same line of argument, in a work carried out at the ILO, Infante (2017) points out that, when structural change results in reduction of productivity gaps, diversification of production structure and aggregate productivity increase, the world of work benefits in equality, because wage gaps are reduced and quality employment becomes more comprehensive. To this end, work

must be freely chosen, productive, adequately remunerated and backed up by appropriate social protection – in short, decent work, in ILO terms. This combination of factors was present in Latin America in this recent developmentalism interregnum (2000s), when the feasibility of simultaneous and non-contradictory policies of economic growth and job creation was verified in several countries, in addition to labor and social protection policies designed to ratify – at the same time as feedback – the very growth of the economy.

In this context, formalization policies must contemplate two simultaneous objectives: i) on the one hand, to facilitate the way of the working class to the formal economy and to effectively promote productive employment in the already formalized economy; (ii) on the other hand, to improve the working and living conditions of those in the informal economy, so that the general orientation is of more and better social inclusion than punishment or segregation (TOKMAN, 2009; 2010).

Lastly, Cardoso Jr. and Hamasaki (2014), when studying the Brazilian experience between the decades of liberalism (1990) and developmentalism (2000) regarding the relationship between patterns of development, labor market and social protection, had already pointed to the need for a more explicit, organic and systemic agenda for development, anchored in the following positive transformation vectors:

- I) recover and sustain economic growth on a more solid basis and at higher levels than the current ones. That is, the deliberate induction of the state towards a scientific-technical-productive revolution capable of combining stimuli to the so-called green economy and environmental education, with innovative link building in the productive and institutional spheres of processes and products;
- II) institutional restructuring of the pattern of public funding in general and of social policies in particular. That is, both tax and fiscal reform that is able to combine progressivity in the collection with redistributive spending;
- III) consolidation of civilizational minimums for the regulation (structuring and regulation) of the world of work. That is, deepening of a culture of rights, referenced to the set of human, economic,

- social, cultural and environmental rights (the so-called DhESCA Platform);
- IV) politically deliberate promotion of the functional and personal distribution of income;
  - V) construction of new institutions in the state-society relationship for the promotion of broad citizenship and for democratic consolidation. That is, ethical-political reform in the systems of representation, participation and deliberation, valuing the public sphere and citizenship at all levels.

This set of strategic guidelines clearly emerges alongside the political and academic debate advocated by sectors within the progressive field of Latin American society within and outside government structures. As a corollary, it is believed that there is no positive solution within the liberal-conservative path. Defended by atavistic sectors of society, political communities (parties, trade unions and other associations) and the bureaucracy itself, in addition to the media and business sector, this political alternative, aimed at emptying the role of the state, is again bringing dire consequences to Latin America and other places in the world.

In the case of Latin America, the liberal path already tried during the 1990s provoked, among others, productive disarticulation, financialization of wealth, precarization of the labor market, and dismantling of the social protection system, which was then in formation. The liberal path, therefore, makes unviable the sustained paths of economic and social homogenization to the countries that adhere to it, and cannot constitute a credible alternative to the challenges of contemporary times placed in the region already in this second decade of the twenty-first century. Faced with the barbarity of the structural dependence that is once again coming close to the continent, the Latin American countries and peoples still have left the unrestricted search for national reaffirmation as a path to new civilizational achievements.

## REFERENCES

AMARANTE, V.; ARIM, R. (Eds.). **Desigualdad e Informalidad**: un análisis de cinco experiencias latinoamericanas. Santiago: CEPAL, 2015.

BIELSCHOWSKY, R.; TORRES, M. (Comps.). **Desarrollo e Igualdad**: el pensamiento de la CEPAL en su séptimo decenio: textos seleccionados del período 2008-2018. Santiago: CEPAL, 2018.

CARDOSO JR., J. C. **Mundo do Trabalho e (Des)proteção Social no Brasil**: ensaios de interpretação da história recente. 2013. Tese (Doutorado em Desenvolvimento) – Instituto de Economia da Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2013.

CARDOSO JR., J. C.; CAMPOS, A. G. A situação laboral da América Latina na primeira década de 2000. In: RODRIGUES, V. A. (Org.). **Observatório Internacional de Capacidades Humanas, Desenvolvimento e Políticas Públicas**. Brasília: OICH/Nesp/Ceam/UnB e Opas/OMS, 2013.

CARDOSO JR., J. C.; HAMASAKI, C. S. **Padrões de desenvolvimento, mercado de trabalho e proteção social**: a experiência brasileira entre as décadas liberal (1990) e desenvolvimentista (2000). Brasília: Ipea, TD n. 2021, 2014.

CASTEL, R. **El Ascenso de las Incertidumbres**: trabajo, protecciones, estatuto del individuo. Buenos Aires: FCE, 2010.

CEPAL. **A Hora da Igualdade**: brechas por fechar, caminhos por abrir. Brasília: Cepal, 2010.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Mudança Estrutural para a Igualdade**: uma visão integrada do desenvolvimento. San Salvador: Cepal, 2012a.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Eslabones de la Desigualdad**: heterogeneidad estructural, empleo y protección social. Santiago, Chile: CEPAL, 2012b.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Pactos para la Igualdad**: *hacia un futuro sostenible*. Lima: CEPAL, 2014.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Horizontes 2030**: a igualdade no centro do desenvolvimento sustentável. Cidade do México: Cepal, 2016.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Panorama Social 2017**. Santiago: CEPAL, 2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. **La Ineficiencia de la Desigualdad**. Havana: CEPAL, 2018.

DURÁN, G. Institucionalidad laboral para un desarrollo inclusivo. In: INFANTE, R. (Ed.). **El Desarrollo Inclusivo en América Latina y el Caribe**: ensayos sobre políticas de convergencia productiva para la igualdad. Santiago: CEPAL, 2011.

ESPING-ANDERSEN, G. **Fundamentos Sociales de las Economías Postindustriales**. Barcelona: Ariel, 2000.

GARCIA, M. H.; CALVETE, C. S. Colômbia, Brasil e Venezuela e os impactos no mercado de trabalho. São Paulo, **Revista IEA-USP**, n. 29, v. 85, 2015.

INFANTE, R. **América Latina en el “Umbral del Desarrollo”**: un ejercicio de convergencia productiva. Santiago: Proyecto “Desarrollo inclusivo”, Documento de Trabajo 14, p. 8, 2011. mimeo.

\_\_\_\_\_. **América Latina**: crecimiento, cambio estructural y formalización: 2000-2015. Santiago: OIT, 2017. mimeo.

LEITE, M. P. A sociologia do trabalho na América Latina: seus temas e problemas revisitados. Rio de Janeiro, **Revista de Sociologia e Antropologia**, v. 2, n.4, oct./dec. 2012.

OIT. **Panorama Laboral 2017**. Lima: OIT/Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe, 2017.

RÚIZ, M. L. V. (Ed.). **La Reforma Laboral en América Latina**: 15 años después. Lima: OIT, 2005.

SOJO, A. **Protección Social en América Latina**: la desigualdad en el banquillo. Santiago: CEPAL, 2017.

TOKMAN, V. E. Flexibilidad con informalidad: opciones y restricciones. In: WELLER, J. (Comp.). **El nuevo escenario laboral latinoamericano**. Regulación, protección y políticas activas en los mercados de trabajo. Santiago: Siglo Veintiuno, CEPAL, 2009.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Una Voz en el Camino**: empleo y equidad en América Latina – 40 años de búsqueda. Santiago: FCE, 2010.

TOLEDO, E. G.; NEFFA, J. C. (Comps.). **Trabajo y Modelos Productivos en América Latina**: Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, México y Venezuela luego de las crisis del modo de desarrollo neoliberal. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2010.

WELLER, J. **Crecimiento, empleo y distribución de ingresos en América Latina**. Santiago: CEPAL, 2012a. Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo, n. 122.

WELLER, J. Panorama de las condiciones de trabajo en Latinoamérica. **Revista Nueva Sociedad**, 2012b.